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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH CHARLES JENSEN and 
BESSY T. JENSEN, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVIS COUNTY, a body politic 
of the State of Utah, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 930180-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
1. Appellants filed their appeal in the Supreme Court of 
Utah. Thereafter, the Supreme Court under date of March 25, 1993, 
directed that the case be transferred to the Court of Appeals for 
disposition. Appellants appeal from the judgment entered in their 
favor granting Appellants damages and specific performance. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
It is Appellee's position that Appellants raise no issues 
to be decided by this Court and, consequently, the judgment of the 
lower Court should be affirmed. The Brief of Appellants is so 
muddled and flawed that Appellee will not attempt to interpret the 
issues raised by it. Rather, the issues which Appellee addresses 
are as follows: 
1. Appellants' failure to provide a record transcript of 
all evidence relevant to their contested Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law requires the presumption that the verdict was 
supported by admissible and competent evidence. Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) cert, denied, 776 P.2d 
916 (Utah 1989). Accord Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1985) 
and Bevan v. J.H. Construction Co., 669 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983). 
2. Appellants' failure to demonstrate that marshalled 
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court is 
legally insufficient to support the findings of fact requires the 
decision of the lower court to be affirmed. Turnbauah v. Anderson, 
793 P.2d 939 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
3. Unless Appellants can show that the trial court's 
Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous, the appellate court must 
not disturb the trial court's findings. State v. Martinez, 811 
P.2d 205 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 
4. The trial court correctly applied the proper measure of 
damages for a breach of contract. Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692 
(Utah 1982), Young Electric Sign Company v. United Standard West, 
755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988), and Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Company, 
455 P.2d 197 (Utah 1969). 
5. Appellants' claims of constitutional rights violations 
were not raised at the trial court, or anywhere for that matter, 
and, therefore, cannot be raised on appeal. Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). Accord, Johnson v. 
Department of Employment Security, 782 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) 
and Pratt v. City Council of City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah 
1981). 
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6. Appellants' acceptance of the benefits of the judgment 
estops Appellants from attacking the judgment on appeal. Cingolni 
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
7. Appellants' brief fails to comply with Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and their appeal should be 
dismissed. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
8. Appellants are not entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable rule which disposes of Appellants' Appeal is 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A copy of the 
Rule is included as Exhibit A in the Addendum to Appellee's brief. 
Also, Section 78-27-56.5, Utah Code Ann., (1953) as 
amended, disposes of the Appellants' claim for attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 17, 1991, Appellants filed their Complaint in 
the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County claiming a 
breach of contract. Appellee answered the Complaint asserting 
various defenses, including impossibility of performance of the 
contract. 
The case was tried to the bench with the Honorable Jon M. 
Memmott presiding on October 28th and October 29th, 1992. The 
Court issued a Memorandum Decision on December 4, 1992, declaring 
that Defendant/Appellee had not met its burden in establishing the 
defense of impossibility of contract and awarded to 
Plaintiff/Appellant judgment in the amount of $4,165.03, together 
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with a Decree of Specific Performance requiring Defendant/Appellee 
to build a flood control channel and install field drains and a 
barbed wire fence. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
reflecting the Memorandum Decision were signed by the lower Court 
on January 20, 1993. Thereafter, Appellants filed their Notice of 
Appeal on February 16, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Under the heading "Statement of Facts" Appellants have 
rambled on about the history of farming in Davis County but none of 
the information identified as facts was presented to the lower 
court. Except for the Memorandum Decision of the court and the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered by the 
courtf nothing in Appellants' addenda was introduced at trial. 
Nothing in Appellants' brief refers to the original record or any 
reporter's transcript as required by Subparagraph (e) of Rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Appellee's Statement of Facts is as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs/Appellants through their attorney Richard W. 
Jones filed a Complaint in the District Court of Davis County 
asserting a breach of contract. (TR. 1-2). 
2. Attached to the Complaint was a copy of the agreement 
between Appellants and Appellee dated December 30, 1987, wherein 
Davis County agreed to install by December 1988 a flood control 
channel on property which it had purchased from Appellants. (TR. 
4-7). 
3. On September 10, 1991, Steven E. Clyde, Appellants' 
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second attorney, made an Entry of Appearance in the matter. (TR. 
51). 
4. Steven E. Clyde filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel 
dated January 9, 1992. (TR. 54). 
5. Appellants' third attorney, Scott W. Holt, and the 
attorney who represented Appellants through trial, made an Entry of 
Appearance on April 10, 1992. (TR. 59). 
6. At trial, the court found that Appellee had failed to 
carry its burden of proof to establish impossibility of 
performance. (TR. 78-90). 
7. The court found that in order to make Appellants' 
ground productive it would be necessary for them to install 
interceptor drains on the east side of their property and rip the 
hard pan on their property. (TR. 91) 
8. The court found that the Appellee by not cleaning the 
current drains that Appellants had dug on the property conveyed to 
Appellee caused limited damage to crop production in the amount of 
10% of the production per year. (TR. 91). 
9. Relying upon the expert testimony of Professor Lyman 
Willardson of Utah State University, the court found that failure 
to dig a deep drain of 11 feet deep would make very little 
difference in the productivity of Appellants' soil. The Court, 
therefore, found that Appellants would not suffer damage in crop 
production as a result of the County's failure to build the 11 foot 
deep channel. (TR. 91). 
10. The court found that Appellants' damage was equal to 
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$4,165.03. (TR. 92). 
11. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
were signed and entered by the court on January 21, 1993. (TR. 
159-167). 
12. Davis County issued its check made payable to Joseph 
Charles and Bessy T. Jensen in the amount of $4,165.03 which check 
was endorsed by Appellants and presented for payment on January 19, 
1993. (Exhibit B of the Addendum). 
13. Scott W. Holt filed with the District Court a 
Withdrawal of Counsel dated January 14, 1993. (TR. 158). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Appellants have failed to provide a record transcript 
of all evidence relevant to any contested Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law, so that a presumption exists that the verdict 
was supported by admissible and competent evidence. 
2. Appellants have failed to marshall the evidence and 
demonstrate through the evidence that the trial court's Findings of 
Fact are legally insufficient. 
3. Unless the Appellants can show that the trial court's 
Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous, the Appellate Court must 
not disturb them. 
4. The trial court correctly applied the proper measure of 
damages for a breach of contract. 
5. Appellants' claims of constitutional rights violations 
were not raised at the trial court or anywhere and, therefore, 
cannot be raised on appeal. 
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6. Appellants' acceptance of the benefits of the judgment 
estops Appellants from attacking the judgment on appeal. 
7. Appellants are not entitled to attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO PROVIDE A RECORD TRANSCRIPT 
OF ALL EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO ANY CONTESTED FINDINGS 
OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REQUIRE THE 
PRESUMPTION THAT THE VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY 
ADMISSIBLE AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
After two full days of trial where numerous expert 
witnesses were examined and cross-examined, and exhibits were 
introduced, the court made Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
entered a judgment in favor of Appellants. A significant record 
was developed in the court below, yet Appellants have transcribed 
only the testimony of Sidney W. Smith, the Public Works Director of 
Davis County. 
Appellants' brief makes only unintelligible references to 
the transcript or the record. Additionally, Appellants attempt to 
present to the court in their addenda hearsay evidence which was 
never presented in the trial court below and has nothing to do with 
the breach of contract claim asserted by Appellants in the lower 
court. The record in the trial court, therefore, becomes essential 
to understanding the facts presented to the judge which allowed him 
to make the ruling which he made. So important is the complete 
record that the court in Smith v. Vuicich, 669 P.2d 763 (Utah 
1985), declared: 
Where the record before us is incomplete, we are 
unable to review the evidence as a whole and must, 
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therefore, presume that the verdict was supported 
by admissible and competent evidence. 
At page 765. 
(See also Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) 
cert denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). 
The court noted in Sampson that Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure requires Appellants to provide the 
court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal. 
At page 1002 the court said: 
Accordingly, because the entire record in this 
case in not before this court, we presume the 
trial court's findings are supported by competent 
and sufficient evidence... 
The court went on to observe in Sampson that the findings 
must clearly indicate the mind of the court and resolve all issues 
of material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of law and 
the judgment entered. Without question, the Findings of Fact 
(Exhibit C) clearly indicate the mind of the court. The attention 
of the court is invited to paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact 
where the judge acknowledges conflicting testimony from experts and 
indicates that he bases his findings upon the credibility and 
weight of the testimony of the experts. The court then 
specifically determined that the damage caused by Appellee's 
failure to clean the present storm drain was limited to 10% of the 
crop production per year. After hearing the evidence, the court 
specifically found that Appellants would not suffer damage from 
failure to dig the storm drain 11 feet deep. It is apparent from 
the findings of the court that the court was persuaded Appellants' 
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lack of crop production was substantially impacted by their failure 
to dig an interceptor drain on the northeast side of their property 
and to rip the hard pan on their property. The court found that 
$4,165.03 was the amount of damage which resulted because Appellee 
Davis County failed to clean the present ditch. The Findings of 
Fact are clear and the inescapable conclusion is the court must 
affirm the lower court decision. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE THROUGH THE 
MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS WERE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT REQUIRES THE 
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT TO BE AFFIRMED. 
A compelling reason why the Appellate Rules require a full 
transcript of the relevant evidence is noted in Doelle v. Bradley, 
784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989): 
To successfully attack the Findings of Fact, an 
appellant must first marshall all the evidence 
supporting the findings and then demonstrate that 
even if viewed in the light most favorable to the 
trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient 
to support the findings. 
At page 1178. 
Appellants are, therefore, required to marshall the evidence to 
demonstrate that the trial court's findings were insufficient. 
There is no recognizable marshalling of the evidence in Appellants' 
brief. 
Citing Doelle with approval, the court in Turnbaugh v. 
Anderson, 793 P.2d 939 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) said, 
Findings of fact "should not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
At page 941. 
The clearly erroneous standard of Turnbaugh was also applied in 
State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205 (Utah App.Ct. 1991). 
There is nothing in Appellants' brief or in the limited 
transcript of the record which even remotely rises to the level of 
"clearly erroneous." The trial court weighed the conflicting 
evidence and entered a judgment in Appellants' favor. It is 
apparent that Appellants are angry with the Army Corps of Engineers 
(not even a party) and Davis County and are not pleased with the 
ruling of the trial judge. Their brief is simply an attempt to 
retry the case to the Appellate Court using evidence that was not 
even introduced in the trial court rather than point out 
deficiencies in the facts upon which the trial court made its 
ruling. Such cannot be and this court must affirm the trial court 
below. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE PROPER 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR A BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
It has long been established in Utah that the proper 
measure of damages for a breach of contract is to award an amount 
which is necessary to place the non-breaching party in as good a 
position as if the contract had been performed. Alexander v. 
Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982). The court in Young Electric 
Sign Company v. United Standard West, 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988), 
relied upon Alexander and said, 
In general, contractual damages are measured by 
the lost benefit of the bargain... 
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At page 164. 
In Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Company, 455 P.2d 197 (Utah 1969 U 
In Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Company, 455 P.2d 197 (Utah 1969), 
the court instructed that when the claim is based upon a definite 
contract the appropriate assessment of damages is: 
...that a non-beaching party should receive an 
award which will put him in as good a position as 
he would have been had there been no breach. 
At page 198. 
In applying the law to the facts the trial court in this 
case determined that Appellee breached the contract when it failed 
to construct an 11 foot deep channel. However, the court also 
found that a 6 foot deep channel would have drained Appellants' 
property sufficiently to allow it to yield the same crop that it 
would have if an 11 foot deep ditch had been dug. The 6 foot deep 
ditch already in existence would have been cleaned if Appellee had 
performed under the contract. Because the existing ditch was not 
cleaned, Appellee caused some limited damage to Appellants' crop 
production which the court specifically found was 10% of the 
production per year for three and one half years. Therefore, if 
Appellee had fully performed under the contract, Appellants would 
have received $4,165.03 in increased income from crop production. 
Consequently, the damages awarded to Appellants places them in the 
same position they would have been in if Appellee had fully 
performed under the contract. The trial court's application of the 
law to the facts is consistent with the standard set by the Supreme 
Court and should be upheld on appeal. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANTS' CLAIMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS WERE NOT RAISED AT THE TRIAL COURT OR 
ANYWHERE AND, THEREFORE, CANNOT BE RAISED ON 
APPEAL. 
The Complaint of Appellants filed by their first attorney 
and not modified by any of their subsequent attorneys asserted a 
breach of contract claim. The record is entirely devoid of any 
assertion that Appellants' constitutional rights were violated. 
Not before the trial court or anywhere else have Appellants raised 
constitutional issues until Appellants in their brief assert a 
constitutional taking of their property. Had Appellants raised the 
issue below, it would have been challenged because Appellee 
believed it paid Appellants fair market value for their property. 
However, it has long been recognized that issues not raised at 
trial cannot be raised on appeal. 
In Pratt v. City Council of the City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 
172 (1981), the court squarely addressed the issue. Responding to 
a constitutional claim for the first time on appeal the court said, 
Issues not raised at trial cannot be raised on 
appeal. This general rule applies equally to 
constitutional issues, with the limited exception 
of where a person's liberty is at stake. Inasmuch 
as the constitutionality of the act was never 
raised at trial, plaintiffs are, therefore, 
precluded from raising it on appeal. 
At page 173-174. 
In Johnson v. Department of Employment Security, 782 P.2d 
965 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), the court declined to address the issue of 
violation of constitutional guarantees of equal protection when 
Johnson raised the issue for the first time on appeal. The court 
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instructed, 
...We do not consider issues raised for the first 
time on appeal. Rekward v. Industrial Commission, 
755 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). This 
general rule applies to constitutional issues 
first raised on appeal as well as to other issues, 
unless a person's liberty is at stake. Pratt v. 
City Council of the City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 
172, 173-174 (Utah 1981); see Pease v. Industrial 
Commission, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984) 
(petitioner has the responsibility to raise all 
issues that could be presented at the time, 
including constitutional issues, for the issues to 
K
~ presented for appeal). 
972. 
Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange, * . * - . •
 t> < < where the claim was 
that an awa rd of compensatory punitive damages v.i n I atpnj n 
i process provisions of the Utah 
Constitution, However, the claims were first argued on appeal. 
The Supreme Court declared, 
Fire insurance did not, however, raise these 
arguments before the trial court and has, 
therefore, waived any right to present them on 
appeal,.,. 
At page 800. 
Simply stated, AppeJ Lants cannot,. imw ra.iwe ciiiiins ot constituti onal 
depravati on for the fi rst time on appeal. 
POINT V 
APPELLANTS ACCEPTANCE OF THE BENEFITS OF THE 
JUDGMENT ESTOPS APPELLANTS FROM ATTACKING THE 
JUDGMENT ON APPEAL. 
Included as addendum -
c : ant<=i Joseph Charles Bessy 
r
. ensen amount $4,165 •• - which s the same amount as 
u 
the judgment rendered by the court. The check was endorsed and 
presented for payment on January 19, 1993. Appellants have, 
therefore, accepted the benefits of the judgment while at the same 
time they are pursuing the appeal before this court. In Cinaolani 
v. Utah Power and Light Company, 790 P.2d 1219 (Utah Ct.App. 1990), 
the court described the doctrine of acceptance of the benefits as 
follows: 
Under the general acceptance-of-the-benefits 
doctrine, one who accepts a benefit under a 
judgment is estopped from later attacking the 
judgment on appeal, and one who acquiesces in the 
judgment cannot later attack. Tree v. Lewis. 738 
P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987);... 
At page 1221. 
It is, therefore, clear that Appellants have accepted the benefit 
of the judgment and are estopped from attacking the judgment on 
appeal. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Appellants seem to claim in their brief that the court 
erred by not awarding them attorney's fees. The trial court 
addressed the issue in its Conclusions of Law as follows: 
Because the contract has no provision which allows 
at least one party to recover attorney's fees as 
required in Section 78-27-56.5 and because the 
court finds the defense was with merit and brought 
in good faith, the court does not award any costs 
or attorney's fees. 
Section 78-27-56.5, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, which 
was referenced by the court states the following: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to 
either party that prevails in a civil action based 
14 
upon any promissory note, written contract, or 
other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when 
the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing allowed at least one 
party to recover attorney's fees. 
. , . - im was 
signed on December 30, 1987. The contract has no provision about 
attorney's fees Phe statute, therefore, precludes the court from 
fees to el ther party. 
The statutory provision is consistent with prior Utah case 
law. In Caur v. Enoch Smith Co . , 781 !» 2d I •>')•' (llf.«.ih i '1. „ App. 
] 989 | , Mio court sa i.d, 
We do, however, find error in awarding attorney's 
fees in favor of Smith. "The general rule in Utah 
is that attorney fees cannot be recovered absent 
statutory authorization or contract." Cooper v. 
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Association, 757 
P.2d 483, 486 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). See also 
Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304, 309 (Utah 
1979) . 
At page 129fi. 
There i s no [u ovi si on i ii I. he con I i »M "I" betwi ien the pdi.'l.ies 
for an award of attorney's fees, therefor? -, the ruling of the trial 
court about attorney's fees is proper < nu should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Appellee respectfully submits that based upon the 
foregoing this court most dismiss the appeal and affirm the 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3^o day of /hi^xA^h 
1993. 
21. Gera ld-ls. Hes s 
Chief Civil Deputy 
Davis County Attorney's Office 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT - Rule 24 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
EXHIBIT - Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
EXHIBI1 
*|W> 
wjunsel of record or by a part) who IK not represented 
jy counsel. 
Rule 22. Computation and enlargement of time. 
(a) Computation of time. In computing any pe-
riod of time prescribed by these rules, by an order of 
the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the 
act, event, or default from which the designated pe-
riod of time begins to run shall not be included. The 
last day of the period shall be included, unless it is a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which 
event the period extends until the end of the next day 
that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less 
than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, 
and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computa-
tion. As used in this rule, "legal holiday" includes 
(Jays designated as holidays by the state or federal 
governments. 
(b) Enlargement of time. The court for good cause 
shown may upon motion enlarge the time prescribed 
by these rules or by its order for doing any act, or may 
permit an act to be done after the expiration of such 
time, but the court may not enlarge the time for filing 
a notice of appeal or a petition for review from an 
order of an administrative agency, except as specifi-
cally authorized by law. A motion for an enlargement 
of time shall be filed prior to the expiration of the 
time for which the enlargement is sought. A motion 
for enlargement of time shall: 
(1) State with particularity the reasons for 
granting the motion; 
(2) State whether the movant has previously 
been granted an enlargement of time and, if so, 
the number and duration of such enlargements; 
(3) State when the time will expire for doing 
the act for which the enlargement of time is 
sought; and 
(4) State the date on which the act for which 
the enlargement of time is sought will be com-
pleted. 
(c) Ex parte motion. Except as to enlargements of 
time for filing and service of briefs under Rule 26(a), 
a party may file one ex parte motion for enlargement 
of time not to exceed 14 days if no enlargement of 
time has been previously granted, if the time has not 
already expired for doing the act for which the en-
largement is sought, and if the motion otherwise com-
plies with the requirements and limitations of para-
graph (b) of this rule. 
(d) Additional time after service by mail. 
Whenever a party is required or permitted to do an 
act within a prescribed period after service of a paper 
and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall be added 
to the prescribed period. 
Rule 23. Motions. 
(a) Content of motion; response; reply. Unless 
another form is elsewhere prescribed by these rules, 
an application for an order or other relief shall be 
made by filing a motion for such order or relief with 
proof of service on all other parties. The motion shall 
contain or be accompanied by the following: 
( D A specific and clear statement of the relief 
sought; 
(2) A particular statement of the factual 
grounds; 
(3) If the motion is for other than an enlarge-
ment of time, a memorandum of points and au-
thorities in support; and 
(4) Affidavits and papers, where appropriate. 
Any party may file a response in opposition to a 
motion within 10 days after service of the motion; 
however, the court may, for good cause shown, dis-
pense with, shorten or extend the time for responding 
to any motion. 
(b) Determination of motions for procedural 
orders. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 
(a) of this rule as to motions generally, motions for 
procedural orders which do not substantially affect 
the rights of the parties or the ultimate disposition of 
the appeal, including any motion under Rule 22(b), 
may be acted upon at any time, without awaiting a 
response. Pursuant to rule or order of the court, mo-
tions for specified types of procedural orders may be 
disposed of by the clerk. The court may review a dis-
position by the clerk upon motion of a party or upon 
its own motion. 
(c) Power of a single justice or judge to enter-
tain motions. In addition to the authority expressly 
conferred by these rules or by law, a single justice or 
judge of the court may entertain and may grant or 
deny any request for relief which under these rules 
may properly be sought by motion, except that a sin-
gle justice or judge may not dismiss or otherwise de-
termine an appeal or other proceeding, and except 
that the court may provide by order or rule that any 
motion or class of motions must be acted upon by the 
court. The action of a single justice or judge may be 
reviewed by the court. 
(d) Form of papers; number of copies. 
(1) Except for motions to enlarge time, five 
copies shall be filed with the original in the Su-
preme Court, and four copies shall be filed with 
the original in the Court of Appeals, but the 
court may require that additional copies be fur-
nished. Only the original of a motion to enlarge 
time shall be filed. 
(2) Motions and other papers shall be type-
written on opaque, unglazed paper 8V2 by 11 
inches in size. The text shall be in type not 
smaller than ten characters per inch. Lines of 
text shall be double spaced and shall be upon one 
side of the paper only. Consecutive sheets shall 
be attached at the upper left margin. 
(3) A motion or other paper shall contain a 
caption setting forth the name of the court, the 
title of the case, the docket number, and a brief 
descriptive title indicating the purpose of the pa-
per. The attorney shall sign all papers filed with 
the court with his or her individual name. The 
attorney shall give his or her business address, 
telephone number, and Utah State Bar number 
in the upper left hand corner of the first page of 
every paper filed with the court except briefs A 
party who is not represented by an attorney shall 
sign any paper filed with the court and state the 
party's address and telephone number. 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appel-
lant shall contain under appropriate headings and in 
the order indicated: 
(DA complete list of all parties to the proceed-
ing in the court or agency whose judgment or 
order is sought to be reviewed, except where the 
caption of the case on appeal contains the names 
of all such parties. The list should be set out on a 
separate page which appears immediately inside 
the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, with page references. 
(3) A table of authonties with cases alphabeti-
cally arranged and with parallel citations, rules, 
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statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction 
of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for re-
view and the standard of appellate review for 
each issue with supporting authority for each is-
sue. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordi-
nances, rules, and regulations whose interpreta-
tion is determinative shall be set out verbatim 
with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent 
part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone 
will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall 
be set forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this 
rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement 
shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, 
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in 
the court below. A statement of the facts relevant 
to the issues presented for review shall follow. 
All statements of fact and references to the pro-
ceedings below shall be supported by citations to 
the record (see paragraph (e)). 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of 
arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a suc-
cinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a 
mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, with citations to 
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise re-
lief sought. _ 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee 
shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of 
this rule, except that a statement of the issues or of 
the case need not be made unless the appellee is dis-
satisfied with the statement of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in 
reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee 
has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues 
presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be 
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the 
opposing brief. No further briefs may be filed except 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will 
be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep 
to a minimum references to parties by such designa-
tions as "appellant" and "appellee". It promotes clar-
ity to use the designations used in the lower court or 
in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of 
parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," 
"the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. Refer-
ences shall be made to the pages of the original record 
as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of the 
reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of 
the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement pre-
pared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to 
exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is 
made to evidence the admissibility of which is in con-
troversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the 
transcript at which the evidence was identified, of-
fered, and received or rejected 
(f) Reproduction of opinions, statutes, rules, 
regulations, documents, etc. 
(1) Any opinion, memorandum of decision^ 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or order per* 
taining to the issues on appeal and any jury ia, 
structions or other part of the record of central 
importance to the determination of the appeal 
shall be reproduced in the brief or in an adden-
dum to the brief. ,* 
(2) If determination of the issues presented re* 
quires the study of statutes, rules, regulations, 
etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not 
set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of this rule, 
they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an 
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to. 
the court in pamphlet form. 
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the 
court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and 
reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of cita-
tions and any addendum containing statutes, rules, 
regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a 
cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of 
appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes 
of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise 
agree or the court otherwise orders. The brief of the 
appellee shall contain the issues and arguments in-
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to 
the brief of the appellant. * 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appel-
lants or appellees. In cases involving more than one 
appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join 
in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may 
adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When 
pertinent and significant authorities come to the at-
tention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a 
party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate 
court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be 
filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a refer-
ence either to the page of the brief or to a point ar-
gued orally to which the citations pertain, but the 
letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be 
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly 
limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs un-
der this rule must be concise, presented with accu-
racy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or 
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compli-
ance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attor-
ney fees against the offending lawyer. 
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of 
heavy cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27. 
Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian 
ad litem. 
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad 
litem representing a minor who is not a party to the 
appeal may be filed only if accompanied by written 
consent of all parties, or by leave of court granted on 
motion or at the request of the court. A motion for 
leave shall identify the interest of the applicant and 
shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus 
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable. Except 
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) 
) 
) Civil No. 9107 49203 CV 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly for Trial on the 28th and 29th 
day of October, 1992 before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, one of the Judges of 
the above entitled Court, Plaintiff was present and represented by SCOTT W. 
HOLT and Defendants were represented by Counsel GERALD HESS. 
THE COURT, after having heard testimony of the parties and the 
witnesses and the arguments of Counsel, after review of the evidence 
presented and legal memorandums filed and being further advised, does 
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties entered a contract under which Plaintiff sold a 
portion of his farm ground to Davis County for the construction of a flood 
control channel. The pertinent parts of the contract provided: 
A. The flood control channel was to be 11 feet deep; and 
B. The flood control channel was to be completed on or before 
December, 1988. 
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2. At the time the contract was entered that it was not foreseeable 
that Plaintiffs' property would be subject to "Wetlands Act." Both parties to the 
contract, Plaintiff and the project director for the County, Mr. Sid Smith, 
indicated that at the time of the contract they had no idea or previous 
indication that the Plaintiffs' irrigated farmland would be considered 
wetlands. 
3. The fact that an environmental expert, Mr. Oliver Graw, testified 
at Trial that from looking at a 1987 or 1988 photograph of the Plaintiffs' 
property that certain areas could be potential "wetlands" does not establish 
that the issue of "wetlands" was foreseeable by the parties at the time of 
contract. 
4. That Plaintiff negotiated for the sale of his land based upon the 
construction of the 11 foot deep drainage channel. The Plaintiff sold his land 
at a lower price than he believed was the fair market value. Plaintiff believed 
the flood control channel would act as a field drain which would benefit 
Plaintiffs' land substantially by leaching the ground and removing an alkali 
problem. He believed crop production would double. This was based on 
Plaintiffs' extensive research, prior experience with field drains, other 
properties in the area and discussions with Utah State University Professors. 
5. That Davis County did not complete the 11 foot flood control 
channel on or before December 1988 as required by the Contract. 
6. That the Court found two separate reasons why Davis County did 
not complete the 11 foot flood control channel on or before December 1988 as 
required by the Contract and have not presently completed the project. 
A. In the summer of 1988 the Davis County Commission 
directed Mr. Sid Smith that all the equipment and personnel of Davis County be 
assigned to the completion of the fill project for construction of the Davis 
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County Jail and Court Complex. This project turned out to be larger than 
anticipated and as a result there were no County resources available to 
complete the flood control channel as originally planned. The County 
Commission and Mr. Smith were aware that the contract with the Plaintiff 
could not be completed if personnel and resources were diverted to the other 
project. Despite the contract agreement the County knowingly decided to 
assign resources to another project. Thus, the Court finds upon the facts that 
the County breached the terms of the contract by not completing the project 
on or before December 1988, for a reason separate than set forth in their 
defense of impossibility. The Court finds that the decision to transfer 
resources was prior to any knowledge of "wetland" issues, and that the County 
could not have completed the project on or before December 1988 because of 
the decision to transfer the resources. 
B. Following the decision to divert the equipment and 
resources from the flood control channel project to the Jail Complex project 
the County learned in November of 1988 that there were "wetland" issues 
being raised on the related flood control project in Clinton. Following this 
discovery the County had several meetings and correspondence with the Army 
Corps of Engineers concerning the property involved in this lawsuit. The 
pertinent information the County received was as follows: 
i. April 10, 1989 - Letter from Army Corps of Engineers 
to Sid Smith, Davis County Flood Control. This letter established that the County 
must obtain a 404 permit before they could proceed any further with the flood 
control channel. 
ii. June 23, 1989 - Letter from Army Corps of Engineers 
to Mr. Sid Smith. This letter established the notice to the County that the Army 
Corps of Engineers considered thai the proposed 11 foot channel would drain 
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adjacent wetlands. As such, this was not the "less damaging alternative" as 
required to obtain the required permit. The Army Corps of Engineers 
recommended consideration of a wider canal only two to three feet deep. 
iii. October 6, 1989 - Letter from Army Corps of 
Engineers to Mr. Sid Smith. This letter established again that the 11 foot deep 
channel as required under the contract was not acceptable to the Army Corps 
of Engineers. The letter also established that the permit application from the 
County was not complete and if the County provided a study the Corps would 
consider less damaging alternatives. 
iv. January 26, 1990 - Letter from Army Corps of 
Engineers. This letter responded to several issues raised by the Plaintiff in 
which he indicated that the lands were not subject to the Wetlands Act and the 
County should therefore proceed on the project without a permit. 
7. Based upon testimony of the witnesses and minutes of various 
Syracuse City and Davis County meetings the Court found that the facts 
establish that in addition to the problem with the 404 permits and wetland 
issue the County had difficulties with Syracuse City in obtaining approval for 
the flood control project as designed. As a result the County did not have 
sufficient funds to complete the closed pipe option approved by Syracuse. The 
Court specifically finds that it was a combination of the "wetlands" issues and 
permits, the lack of approval from Syracuse City and lack of adequate funding 
to complete the project that caused the County to not proceed to finish the 
project or proceed to begin the necessary studies to get permit approval for 
"less damaging alternatives." The Court is not able, based upon the evidence, to 
determine which was the primary factor for not proceeding with the permit 
application (for any alternative) and construction of the flood control 
channel. The Court does find that each issue was a significant factor in not 
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proceeding with the permit application and project. 
8. In 1992 Syracuse City obtained Community block grant funds 
which are being applied to this flood control project. With these additional 
funds and approval of Syracuse City, the County has retained consultants from 
Ekitone to complete the necessary environmental studies in order to submit a 
complete 404 application to receive the permit in order to complete the flood 
control channel. 
9. The County is now developing "less damaging alternative plans" 
for the flood control channel. This is approximately 3-1/2 years after they 
received notice of an incomplete application from the Army Corps of 
Engineers. 
10. As to damages that have resulted because the County has not 
constructed the 11 foot deep flood control channel the Court received 
conflicting testimony from the Plaintiff, Mr. Jensen, Plaintiffs expert - Prof. 
Gilbert Miller, PHD., and Defendant's expert - Prof. Lyman Willardson, PHD. 
Based upon the credibility and weight of the testimony the Court makes the 
following findings relating to the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs. 
A. That the Plaintiffs farm land is in an area with significant 
ground water, alkali and hard pan problems. 
B. That only by developing an extensive field drain system 
and riping the hard pan would the Plaintiff be able to increase production 
beyond current levels. 
C That the County by not cleaning the current drains that 
Plaintiffs had dug on the land he conveyed that the County caused some limited 
damage to crop production. The Court finds that damage to be 10% of 
production per year. 
D. That as established by Prof. Lyman Willardson a deep drain 
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on the west side of the property would have very little impact for two reasons: 
(1) The ground water comes from the Northeast and therefore an interceptor 
drain is needed on the Northeast side of the property rather than the West; and 
(2) Below a depth of six feet on Plaintiffs' property is clay soil which does not 
allow for permeability. Therefore, there would be very little difference in 
productivity between an 11 foot channel or a six foot channel. 
E The Court finds therefore, that the Plaintiff would not 
suffer damage in crop production for failure of the County in building an 11 
foot deep channel if they build as a "less damaging alternative" a five to six 
foot flood control channel. 
F. The Court finds the damage to Plaintiff for Defendants' 
failure to clean the current drains and proceed to build "less damaging 
alternative drains" at 5'-6' for the last 3-1/2 years is: 
1989 - 4.5 bushels (10% of production) x 123 acres x $2.21 = 
$ 1,223.24 
1990 - 3.78 bushels (10% of production) x 123 acres x $2.16 = 
$ 1,004.27 
1991 - No damage - crop lost 
1992 - 6.97 bushels (10% of production) x 123 acres x $2.26 = 
$ 1.937.52 
TOTAL: $4,165.03 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
In this case, the Court finds that in order for the Defendant to establish 
the contractual defense of impossibility and for the obligation to be deemed 
discharged, they must establish (1) an unforseen event occurring after 
formation of the contract, (2) that they are without fault in relation to the 
Plaintiff under the contract; and (3) the unforseen event makes performance 
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of the contract impossible or highly impracticable. 
In the facts established at trial: 
1. The requirement of a 404 permit was an unforseen event 
occurring after the formation of the contract. 
2. The Defendants are not without fault in relation to the contract. 
The Defendants breached the contract for other reasons prior to learning of 
the 404 permit requirement. The Defendants did not clean and maintain the 
drain on the property they acquired while this dispute continued. The 
Defendants did not proceed to complete the permit application because of other 
reasons, in addition, to the normal 404 permit process. Defendants' own expert 
said a six foot drain would benefit Plaintiff as much as an 11 foot drain, but 
they did not proceed for 3-1/2 years on that permit process. 
3. The performance of the 11 foot drain is highly impracticable or 
impossible if there is a less damaging alternative. However, the performance 
of a permit for a six foot channel or providing other drains on the Northeast of 
the property or other reasonable alternatives were not pursued by the 
Defendant because of other problems with the project with Syracuse City. 
Because of these findings the Court concludes that the Defendant has 
not met its burden in establishing the defense of impossibility. 
The Court would, therefore, grant Plaintiff specific performance limited 
to the County proceeding to build the flood control channel utilizing a "less 
damaging alternative" of five to six foot depth if approved by the Army Corps 
of Engineers. The Court would grant Plaintiff specific performance as to the 
installation of three field drains and the barbed wire fence along the west 
boundary of the property after the construction is completed. 
Because the contract has no provision which allows at least one party to 
recover attorney's fees as required in Section 78-27-56.5 and because the Court 
finds the defense was with merit and brought in good faith the Court does not 
award any costs or attorney's fees. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the 
Court hereby 
ORDERS: 
1. That Plaintiff be awarded damages in the amount of $4,165.03. 
2. That Plaintiff be awarded specific performance limited to the 
County proceeding to build the flood control channel utilizing a "less 
damaging alternative" of five to six foot depth if approved by the Army Corps 
of Engineers. 
3. That Plaintiff be awarded specific performance as to the 
installation of three field drains and the barbed wire fence along the west 
boundary of the property after the construction is completed. 
4. Each party should assume and pay their own attorney's fees and 
costs incurred herein. 
DATED this <^ C> day of January, 1993. 
JiJtJe. 
JON M. MEMMOTT 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
GERALB-flESS, AnorneWbr Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER was mailed to the Attorney for 
Defendant, GERALD HESS, at the Davis County Attorney's Office, at P 0 Box 769, 
Farmington, Utah 84025 this _j£_ day of January, 1993 by depositing same i 
the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
in 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY AND MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered an original and ten true 
and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to: 
The Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City UT 84102 
and two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief 
to: 
Joseph C. Jensen 
Attorney Pro Se for Appellants 
P.O. Box 73 
Clearfield UT 84015 
postage prepaid this j5^fc> day of PfH^u^ / 1993. 
Gefrald^E. Hess <—-^  
jensen2.bri 
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